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Overview
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• Unemployment Insurance enacted under the Social Security Act 
of 1935, operated under laws in all states by June 1937.  
• In 1939 FUTA replaced title IX establishing an IRS statutory 
basis to fund Wagner-Peyser (ES) and federal UI programs.
• Original goals of the UI program:
– Partial income replacement during involuntary joblessness.
– Preventing descent into poverty.
– Automatic stabilizer for the macroeconomy.
– Maintaining employer attachments and reducing layoffs.
– Promoting reemployment.
• Ideally, UI is self-financed with benefits = taxes over cycle.
3Wagner, NY
Dingell, MI
Perkins
Social Security Act, 1935
Lewis, MD
Harrison, MS
Doughton, NC
Partial Income Replacement
• Provide socially adequate weekly benefits while 
involuntarily unemployed and seeking work.
– Replace half lost earnings between limits.
– Minimum a multiple of state minimum wage.
– Maximum at two-thirds average weekly wage.
• Eligible if normally part-time seeking same.
• No special eligibility tests.
• Require high quarter earnings a multiple of AWW, 
and base period earnings >= 1.5*HQE.
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UI Recipiency by State
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UI Recipiency by State, 2017Q2
Prevent Descent into Poverty
• In the Great Recession 19 percent of 
households with unemployment slipped into 
poverty, without UI 24 percent would (CBO).
• UI benefits are an earned entitlement.
• Adequate benefit amounts and durations.
• Validate active work search.
• Provide effective reemployment services.
• RESEA requires updated WPRS models.
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Prevent Descent into Poverty
Automatic Macroeconomy Stabilizer
• When unemployment rises UI injects spending 
to consumers with a high propensity to spend.
• As unemployment falls reserves are rebuilt.
• UI income multiplier estimate 2.5 over prior 6 
recessions (Chimerine et al. USDOL 1999).
• Regular UI eroded; EB triggers ineffective.
• Forward funding is insufficient.
• Counter-cyclical strength is weaker than 2008.
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Automatic Macroeconomic Stabilizer
Benefit levels and durations rose and 
declined with financing adequacy
8
State  Maximum 
Durations
Waiting Weeks Taxable Wages Avg. Tax Rates
Year LE16 GE 26 Low High Low High Total Taxable
1939 43 0 2 4 3,000 3,000 2.66 2.72
1959 0 51 0 1 3,000 4,200 1.06 1.71
1979 0 51 0 1 6,000 11,200 1.26 2.67
1999 0 51 0 1 7,000 27,500 0.56 1.77
2012 2 46 0 1 7,000 38,800 0.90 3.40
2014 2 45 0 1 7,000 41,300 0.79 2.95
Low FUTA taxable wage base contributed to inadequate 
forward funding, cuts in durations and benefit levels, and 
reduced countercyclical strength.
9States That Reduced the Maximum Duration of Unemployment Insurance Benefits to 
Fewer Than 26 Weeks Since 2011
State
Maximum benefit duration 
before reduction 
(weeks)
New maximum 
benefit duration 
(weeks)
Change became 
effective
(year)
Arkansas 26 25 2011
Florida 26 12-23 2011
Georgia 26 14-20 2012
Illinois 26 25 2011
Kansas 26 16-26 2013
Michigan 26 20 2011
Missouri 26 20 2011
North Carolina 26 12-20 2013
South Carolina 26 20 2011
Source: DOL, Comparison of State Unemployment Laws, selected years, and GAO analysis of relevant 
state laws. | GAO-15-281
Automatic Macroeconomy Stabilizer
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Automatic Macroeconomic Stabilizer
Options for Forward Funding and
Countercyclical Financing
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• Set state targets for Average High Cost Multiple.
• Apply a FUTA credit reduction to states with an 
AHCM less than 0.5.  
• Reward states that maintain a 1.0 AHCM.
• Pay incrementally higher interest rates to states 
with balances greater than the target AHCM.
• Index the FUTA taxable wage base to a proportion 
of the Social Security taxable wage base.
• At least 10 steps in rate schedules; no zero rate.
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Employer Attachment – Avoid Layoffs
• Experience rating of employer UI taxes is 
intended to discourage layoffs.
• Research shows experience rating does reduce 
layoffs, but only if it is effective.
• Many states cluster employers at the maximum 
that sometimes is low, and the minimum that 
often is zero.
• Work sharing is available in 29 states and 
should be an employer option in all states.
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Employer Attachment—Avoid Layoffs
Promoting Reemployment
“I had told [President Roosevelt] that the 
Employment Service was practically non-
existent although its name was still on a 
letterhead… He said, “Resurrect the 
Employment Service right away…”
Frances Perkins, Secretary of Labor
Describing ES revitalization in 1933
Promoting Reemployment
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Promoting Reemployment
• UI and ES are complementary programs, but the 
current linkage between UI and ES is weak.
• The ES is chronically underfunded despite 
employer FUTA tax contributions.
• The biggest loss from overpayments is due to 
inadequate enforcement of the work test (ES).
• The RESEA restores the work test and provides 
employment services for the WPRS profiled.
• Worker Profiling and Reemployment Services 
models must be updated, and Wagner-Peyser Act 
(ES) should be funded to deliver services.
16
Promoting Reemployment
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Worker Profiling, 1993
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Employment Services 
19
• Adequately fund the Employment Service.
• The ES administers the UI work test. 
• The RESEA needs a strong ES and WPRS.
• Funding the ES will activate reemployment  
through comprehensive reemployment services.
• Statutory funding for the ES comes from the 
FUTA levy; appropriations are not sufficient.
• Restore ES funding to the 1984 level in real 
terms.  Reagan last to increase FUTA in 1983.
Extended Benefits
20
• States should provide potential durations of at least 
26 weeks regular UI regardless of the TUR level. 
• EB should have TUR triggers.
• EB should be 100 percent paid by the federal 
government from the UTF and, if necessary, from 
general revenues.
• Congress, may exercise discretion to provide 
emergency extended benefits to supplement regular 
UI and EB.
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Emergency Unemployment Compensation
• 1958 - Eisenhower (R)
• 1961- Kennedy (D)
• 1971 - Nixon (R)
• 1975 - Carter (D)
• 1980 - Reagan (R)
• 1982 - Reagan (R)
• 1992 - H.W. Bush (R)
• 2002 - W. Bush (R)
• 2008 - W. Bush (R) -- EUC08 ammended 11 times
• 2009 - Obama (D)
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Emergency Unemployment Compensation
Restoring UI as Social Insurance 
• Improve benefit access.
• Improve benefit amounts and duration.
• Improve forward funding.
• Institute sensitive TUR triggers for EB along 
with 100% federal financing of EB. 
• Fund ES and RESEA for return to work.
• Improve state WPRS models.
• Universal access to Work Sharing and SEA.
• Allow states to offer reemployment bonuses.
24
Benefit and Tax Features
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• Eligibility: HQE: a multiple of AWW; and BPE: 1.5*HQE
• Potential duration: 26 weeks in all states based on prior earnings.
• Benefit formulas: 50% wage replacement.
• Maximum weekly benefit amount: two-thirds of the average weekly 
wage (AWW) in UI covered employment.
• UI Taxable wage base: one-third of the Social Security taxable wage 
base (i.e., $42,400), and indexed to the SS taxable wage base.
• Index and balance benefit and tax provisions.
• Experience rated tax rate: no state allowed to include a zero-rate in 
any tax table and must have at least 10 rates in each tax schedule.
• States should adhere to the appropriate tax schedule under state law.
2018 Budget UI Proposals
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• Establish a federal-state paid parental leave benefit program in UI 
paid for by reducing payment errors.
• Reduce UI payment errors through integrity efforts by helping 
states target more tools and resources toward the problem. 
• Expand Reemployment Services and Eligibility Assessments 
(RESEA). Provide all states funding for RESEAs to one-half of 
eligible UI claimants, plus all ex-military service members.
• Establish a minimum solvency standard, such that states with an 
Average High Cost Multiple (AHCM) of less than 0.5 on two or 
more consecutive January firsts (currently AHCM<0.0) would 
face Federal Unemployment Tax Act (FUTA) credit reductions. 
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